Short answer: PHP2Shell is the collective name for two critical vulnerabilities in the PHP engine (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) disclosed on 21 October 2026. They allow an unauthenticated attacker to run code on a web server and to read server memory, including passwords, session tokens and API keys. PHP released fixed versions the same day (8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35) and stated that updating is the only complete fix. If your company runs a website, an online shop, a customer portal or an internal tool on PHP in Turkey, or processes data of people in Turkey through such a system, three Turkish rules now apply at once: the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (KVKK) requires you to take adequate technical measures and to notify the Data Protection Board within 72 hours of learning of a breach; the Cybersecurity Law No. 7545 requires every entity operating in cyberspace to report vulnerabilities and incidents to the Cybersecurity Presidency "without delay"; and sector regulators (banking, capital markets, telecoms, payments) impose faster, stricter duties on their licensees. On the night of 21 October the Turkish Cybersecurity Presidency issued a nationwide alert calling on all public bodies and companies to apply the updates "urgently". This guide, written by LimanLegal Law Firm in Istanbul, explains what those rules mean for foreign-owned companies, Turkish subsidiaries and foreign businesses with Turkish customers or suppliers, and how they interact with GDPR and NIS2 duties you may already have at home.
Kısa cevaplar
- Scope: every PHP version since 5.4 is affected; WordPress, WooCommerce, Drupal, Joomla, Magento, Laravel, Nextcloud, Roundcube and phpMyAdmin installations are all exposed, whatever the quality of the application code.
- Only fix: update to PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35. PHP 8.1 and older are no longer supported by the PHP project.
- KVKK: patch management is a "technical measure" under Article 12; a breach must be notified to the Board within 72 hours of becoming aware of it (Board decision 2019/10). 2026 fines for security failures: TRY 256,357 to TRY 17,092,242.
- Law No. 7545: all entities must report detected vulnerabilities and incidents to the Cybersecurity Presidency without delay; the administrative fine for breaching this duty is TRY 1 million to TRY 10 million.
- Foreign controllers: a company outside Turkey that processes data of people in Turkey is a data controller under KVKK, must appoint a representative in Turkey and register with VERBİS, and owes the same 72-hour notice.
- Directors: board members of Turkish joint-stock and limited companies owe a duty of care under the Turkish Commercial Code that covers information security; document the decisions you take this week.
- Vendors: your Turkish agency or hosting provider is a "processor" jointly responsible for security under KVKK Article 12/2, but the fine is addressed to you; recourse depends on your contract.
What exactly is PHP2Shell and why does it matter in Turkey?
PHP runs the server side of a very large share of the world's websites; the researchers who found the flaws put the figure at roughly 70 percent. Unlike the typical WordPress plugin bug, PHP2Shell sits in the language engine itself. The first flaw (CVE-2026-109618) is a memory-safety bug in PHP's upload-progress handling that allows both remote code execution and remote disclosure of process memory. The second (CVE-2026-109619) combines a memory bug in fatal-error handling with a type confusion in OPcache and also leads to remote code execution. Both carry a CVSS v4.0 score of 9.2. Neither requires a user account; the typical trigger is a single crafted multipart request.
The flaws were found in August 2026 by Wiz Research, Calif and OpenAI's Codex Security team, partly with AI-assisted code analysis, and reported to the PHP security team on 11 and 24 August. Disclosure was planned for 21 October, but the CVE identifiers leaked on Hacker News on 20 October and PHP brought the release forward to 14:00 UTC on 21 October. Cloudflare reported the first exploitation attempts before the patch was out; watchTowr observed exploitation on its honeypot network the same day. The governments of the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Finland took some official sites offline as a precaution, the FBI and NSA issued warnings, and Censys data cited by Reuters showed roughly 1.5 million of 2.6 million scanned servers still unpatched on the first day.
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| CVEs | CVE-2026-109618 (memory disclosure + RCE) and CVE-2026-109619 (RCE); both CVSS v4.0 9.2 |
| Affected | Nearly every PHP release since 5.4; Apache mod_php (highest risk), PHP-FPM, php-cgi, FrankenPHP, LiteSpeed |
| Fixed versions | PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 (released 21 October 2026) |
| Unsupported | PHP 8.1 and older: no official releases; only source-level backports and distribution packages |
| Workarounds | Disabling session.upload_progress, memory-limit settings, WAF rules on multipart requests — none is complete, according to PHP |
| Exploitation | Attempts observed before and after release; not yet in CISA's KEV catalogue on 21 October |
| Turkish authority | Cybersecurity Presidency nationwide alert, 21 October 2026, sent through the SOME Communication Platform to all institutions and critical-infrastructure operators |
Turkey is a PHP-heavy market. Most small and medium-sized company websites, a large share of e-commerce stores, and many municipal and university sites run on WordPress or other PHP platforms, and most are hosted and maintained by third-party agencies. For a foreign group this typically means that the Turkish subsidiary's website, the local B2B dealer portal and the Turkish-language landing pages are outside the central IT estate and may have been overlooked in the first inventory.
KVKK: is failing to patch a breach of the data security duty, and when does the 72-hour clock start?
Article 12 of the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 obliges the data controller to take "all necessary technical and administrative measures to ensure an appropriate level of security" to prevent unlawful processing of and access to personal data. The Data Protection Authority's Personal Data Security Guide lists software updates, patch management and monitoring of known vulnerabilities among those technical measures, and outdated software is one of the most frequent findings in the Board's published breach decisions. In a case where the vendor has shipped a complete fix, has publicly said that workarounds are insufficient, and the national cybersecurity authority has called for immediate updating, a controller will find it hard to argue that delaying the patch was "appropriate".
Data security — Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698, Article 12 (extract)
(1) The data controller is obliged to take all necessary technical and administrative measures to ensure an appropriate level of security in order to (a) prevent unlawful processing of personal data, (b) prevent unlawful access to personal data, and (c) ensure the preservation of personal data.
(2) Where personal data are processed by another natural or legal person on behalf of the data controller, the data controller is jointly responsible with those persons for taking the measures set out in paragraph 1.
(5) If processed personal data are obtained by others through unlawful means, the data controller shall notify the data subject and the Board as soon as possible. Where necessary, the Board may announce the breach on its website or by any other method it deems appropriate.
The 72-hour rule and what it requires
The Board's decision no. 2019/10 of 24 January 2019 interprets "as soon as possible" as no later than 72 hours for notification to the Board. The period runs from the moment the controller learns of the breach, not from the moment it happened. Notification is made through the Board's Personal Data Breach Notification Form, in Turkish; information may be supplied in stages if it is not all available at once, and a justified delay must be explained in the notification itself. Affected individuals must be informed, under decision no. 2019/271, within the shortest reasonable time after they have been identified, in plain language, with the time of the breach, the categories of data affected, the likely consequences, the measures taken and contact details. The Board may itself publish the breach on its website, which it does regularly, including for foreign companies.
PHP2Shell adds a specific difficulty: the first flaw allows memory to be read without the usual traces of a compromise, such as modified files or a new administrator account. A controller therefore cannot simply conclude "no signs of attack" without reviewing web-server and PHP logs. Researchers describe the characteristic pattern as unusual multipart/form-data requests followed by memory-limit errors or repeated HTTP 500 responses, abnormally large PHPSESSID cookies and unexplained worker restarts. If such traces are found, the moment of that finding is the moment of "learning" and the 72 hours start then. If no logs were kept, that absence is itself likely to be treated as a missing technical measure.
Fines in 2026 and how they are set
| Infringement | Basis | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to meet data security obligations (including unpatched known vulnerabilities and late or missing breach notification) | Art. 18/1-b | TRY 256,357 | TRY 17,092,242 |
| Failure to comply with a Board decision (e.g. post-breach orders) | Art. 18/1-c | TRY 427,263 | TRY 17,092,242 |
| Failure to register with or update VERBİS (data controllers' registry) | Art. 18/1-ç | TRY 341,809 | TRY 17,092,242 |
The Board sets the amount by reference to the nature of the breach, the number of people affected, the controller's degree of fault and its conduct after the incident. Patching on the day of release, reviewing logs, and notifying on time are the most concrete mitigating factors. Board decisions can be challenged before the administrative courts within 30 days of service; a Turkish representative or lawyer is needed for that.
Foreign companies: you are a Turkish data controller too
KVKK applies to any controller that processes personal data of people in Turkey, regardless of where the company is established. Foreign controllers must appoint a representative in Turkey and register with VERBİS without the exemptions that apply to small Turkish businesses; the Board has fined and publicly named foreign companies for late or missing breach notifications. An EU-based group that suffers a PHP2Shell incident on a server serving Turkish customers will therefore owe two parallel notifications: to its lead supervisory authority under Article 33 GDPR and to the Turkish Board under KVKK Article 12/5, each on its own 72-hour clock and in its own language. The Turkish notification cannot be satisfied by sending a copy of the GDPR notification.
Cybersecurity Law No. 7545: who must report to the Cybersecurity Presidency, and what are the penalties?
The Cybersecurity Law No. 7545, published in the Official Gazette on 19 March 2025, is Turkey's framework cybersecurity statute. Its scope is wide: it covers public bodies and all natural and legal persons that "exist, operate or provide services in cyberspace" (Article 2). A company with a website is therefore, in principle, within scope. Article 7 imposes a set of general duties, two of which are directly relevant to PHP2Shell.
Duties — Cybersecurity Law No. 7545, Article 7/1 (summary)
(a) to provide the Presidency, without delay and in the requested form, with any data, information, documents, hardware, software and other contributions it requests within its remit;
(b) to take the measures provided for in the Law and secondary legislation to ensure cybersecurity, and to report detected vulnerabilities or cyber incidents to the Presidency without delay;
(c) for public bodies and critical infrastructure, to procure cybersecurity products, systems and services from experts, producers or companies authorised and certified by the Presidency;
(ç) to obtain the Presidency's approval before starting activities subject to certification, authorisation or licensing; (d) to comply with the Presidency's policies, strategies, action plans and regulatory acts.
Unlike KVKK, Law No. 7545 does not set an hour or day limit; "without delay" is to be defined by regulations and communiqués which, despite the one-year target date of 19 March 2026, have not yet been published in the Official Gazette. What has happened is the designation, by the Cybersecurity Council on 5 May 2026, of fifteen critical infrastructure sectors: digital infrastructure, digital services, electronic communications, energy, finance, food and agriculture, manufacturing, public services, media and crisis communication, postal and cargo services, health, defence industry, water management, transport and space. Operators in those sectors face additional duties, including a cyber incident response team (SOME), regular penetration testing and log sharing with the Presidency. The Presidency also operates the national CERT (USOM), which issues technical alerts.
| Conduct | Basis | Sanction |
|---|---|---|
| Failure to take measures, to report vulnerabilities or incidents (Art. 7/1-b), or to use authorised suppliers (Art. 7/1-c) | Art. 16/10 | Administrative fine TRY 1,000,000 to TRY 10,000,000 |
| Failure to keep systems open and running for inspection (Art. 8/4) | Art. 16/11 | TRY 100,000 to TRY 1,000,000; for commercial companies up to 5% of gross sales revenue in audited annual accounts |
| Refusing to provide requested information, documents, software or data (public bodies excluded) | Art. 16/1 | 1 to 3 years' imprisonment and a judicial fine of 500 to 1,500 days |
| Sharing or offering for sale personal or critical institutional data obtained through a cyberattack | Art. 16/4 | 3 to 5 years' imprisonment |
| Creating or spreading false claims of a data leak in order to cause panic | Art. 16/5 | 2 to 5 years' imprisonment |
| Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure and holding data obtained from them | Art. 16/6 | 8 to 12 years' imprisonment (10 to 15 years if the data are published or sold) |
| Misuse of duties in the protection of critical infrastructure resulting in a data leak | Art. 16/9 | 1 to 3 years' imprisonment |
Note: Article 16/5 deserves attention in the days after a widely reported vulnerability. Publicly asserting that a Turkish company or institution "has been hacked" on the strength of an unverified rumour can be a criminal offence if the claim turns out to be false. Communications teams should clear statements about third parties with counsel.
Sector rules: banks, investment firms, payment institutions, telecoms and online shops
On top of the general framework, regulated sectors have their own information-security rules. Their common feature is that they require faster notification than KVKK's 72 hours and mandate periodic penetration tests.
| Sector | Rule | What it requires |
|---|---|---|
| Banking | BRSA (BDDK) Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services (Official Gazette 15 March 2020) | Immediate notification to the sectoral SOME of incidents that cause data leakage or escalate to a crisis (Art. 18); information to affected customers; annual penetration tests by independent teams; ability to resume operations within 24 hours (Art. 28) |
| Capital markets | CMB (SPK) Communiqué VII-128.9 on Information Systems Management | Information systems management, penetration testing and incident reporting for brokerage houses, portfolio management companies and exchanges; independent IS audits |
| Electronic communications | ICTA (BTK) Regulation on Network and Information Security in the Electronic Communications Sector | Operators must report security incidents to the ICTA, perform risk analysis and align with ISO/IEC 27001 |
| Payments and e-money | Central Bank Regulation on Information Systems of Payment and E-Money Institutions (Law No. 6493) | IS risk management, incident reporting and penetration tests; protection of customer payment data |
| E-commerce | Law No. 6563 on the Regulation of Electronic Commerce, Art. 10, and KVKK | Service providers and intermediary service providers are responsible for the storage and security of personal data they obtain; card data security (PCI DSS) for payment flows |
| Health | Ministry of Health information security directive and KVKK rules on special categories of data | Patient data are special-category data; fines for leaks tend towards the upper end of the range |
Director and manager liability: is cybersecurity part of the duty of care?
Under Article 369 of the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102, board members of a joint-stock company (anonim şirket) must perform their duties with "the care of a prudent manager" and protect the company's interests in good faith. Article 375 lists, among the board's non-delegable duties, establishing the organisation required to manage the company; information security is today an integral part of that organisation. Article 378 requires listed companies, and other companies where the auditor so demands, to set up an early risk detection committee, which must cover cyber risk. Managers of a limited company (limited şirket) owe the same standard under Article 626.
A board may delegate information security to a CIO, a local IT manager or an external provider, but under Article 553 it escapes liability only if it exercised reasonable care in selecting, instructing and supervising that person. Where a vulnerability has been the subject of a national alert, "we were not informed" is a weak defence, particularly in data-rich sectors. Recording the decision taken on PHP2Shell (update order, temporary shutdown, letter to the vendor) in the minutes of the board or the management meeting is the simplest way to evidence the standard of care, and is usually also a condition of cyber insurance cover. Groups should check that the Turkish subsidiary's board, not only the group CISO, has taken and recorded such a decision.
Insurance: Most cyber insurance policies make the timely application of vendor patches a condition of cover or exclude losses arising from known vulnerabilities. Check the patch-management and known-vulnerability clauses of the policy covering the Turkish entity today; insurer notification periods are usually short.
Turkish agencies and hosting providers: who is liable when the vendor did not patch?
Most Turkish company websites are built by a local agency and hosted by a local provider. Under KVKK the company remains the data controller; the agency and the host are processors, and under Article 12/2 they are jointly responsible with the controller for security measures. In practice the Board addresses the fine to the controller and examines whether the controller supervised its processors. "The host did not update PHP" is not accepted as a defence; written instructions to the vendor and the vendor's confirmations are.
Recourse against the vendor is contractual. Under Article 112 of the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, a party that fails to perform properly is liable for the resulting loss unless it proves it was not at fault; under Article 116 it is liable for its subcontractors (data centres, sub-hosts) as for itself. Clauses excluding liability for security incidents, common in Turkish hosting terms, are void under Article 115 where the vendor acted with gross negligence, and leaving a nationally publicised critical vulnerability unpatched for days may, depending on the facts, qualify as such. Commercial damages claims must go through mandatory mediation under Article 5/A of the Commercial Code before a lawsuit can be filed; our guide on recovering commercial claims from Turkish companies explains that procedure.
Four clauses to check in your Turkish vendor contract this week
- Patch window: is there a written deadline (in hours) for applying critical security updates? If not, send a written instruction today and keep the reply.
- Incident notice: how quickly must the vendor tell you about signs of compromise? Your 72-hour KVKK clock does not wait for the vendor.
- Logs and evidence: how long are web-server and PHP logs retained, and will they be handed over on request? Law No. 5651 obliges hosting providers to keep traffic data for one to two years, but application logs may fall outside that duty.
- Liability cap: what is the cap and what are the carve-outs? Remember that caps do not protect a grossly negligent vendor.
If you have been compromised: criminal complaint, evidence and customer claims
An intruder exploiting PHP2Shell commits the offence of unlawful access to an information system under Article 243 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237; altering or deleting data falls under Article 244 (one to five years' imprisonment, two to six years where an unlawful benefit is obtained); obtaining personal data falls under Article 136 (two to four years). Attacks on critical infrastructure trigger Article 16/6 of Law No. 7545. A criminal complaint is filed with the public prosecutor or the cybercrime units of the police; it should include a timeline, the systems affected and a list of preserved evidence. Foreign victims can file through a Turkish lawyer with a notarised and apostilled power of attorney.
Preserve evidence before rebuilding. Wiping and reinstalling the server also destroys the attacker's traces; take a disk image and memory dump, copy web-server, PHP-FPM and system logs to separate storage, and only then rebuild. Turkish courts apply strict rules on the admissibility of electronic evidence (Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 134), so the chain of custody matters. If customer data have been used in follow-on fraud, warning customers promptly is both a KVKK duty and a way to limit secondary loss; our guide on recovering money from online fraud in Turkey describes the account-freezing tools available.
Affected individuals may claim compensation: KVKK Article 11/1-ğ gives data subjects the right to seek redress for damage caused by unlawful processing, and the Code of Obligations provides the basis in tort (Article 49) and for non-pecuniary damages for violation of personality rights (Article 58). Turkey has no class actions, but a large number of individual consumer claims before consumer arbitration committees and consumer courts can exceed the regulatory fine. A Board fine makes fault easier to prove but is not a precondition for a claim.
How Turkish duties interact with GDPR, NIS2 and DORA
For EU-headquartered groups the Turkish obligations run in parallel with, and are not replaced by, European ones. Three points of friction come up repeatedly. First, the 72-hour clocks under GDPR Article 33 and KVKK start from the same moment of awareness but require separate filings in different languages, to different authorities, with different forms; a group incident response plan should name the person responsible for the Turkish filing. Second, NIS2 early-warning (24 hours) and incident-notification (72 hours) duties apply to the EU entity, while the Turkish subsidiary owes the "without delay" report under Law No. 7545, which has no numerical deadline yet; treating the Turkish report as due on the NIS2 timetable is a safe working rule. Third, Turkish data must not be transferred abroad for incident analysis without a lawful transfer mechanism under KVKK Article 9 (standard contractual clauses notified to the Board, binding corporate rules or an adequacy decision); forensic teams outside Turkey should be covered by one of these before log files leave the country.
Companies incorporated in Turkey by foreign shareholders remain Turkish legal persons for all of the above; our guide on company formation in Turkey for foreigners explains the corporate forms and the resulting management duties.
72-hour legal checklist for companies with Turkish operations
Run these steps in parallel with the technical patching work, and time-stamp each one; the record is your best evidence of due care.
- Inventory. List every PHP system serving Turkey: corporate site, online shop, dealer portal, intranet, webmail, phpMyAdmin, staging servers; record PHP version, host and owner. Forgotten subdomains are the usual entry point.
- Update or isolate. Upgrade to 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35. Where that is not immediately possible, take the system offline or allow only GET/HEAD requests, and record the decision and its reasons.
- Write to Turkish vendors. Ask the agency and host for written confirmation of the update, the PHP version and the last 30 days of access logs. E-mail suffices; a notarised notice follows if there is no reply.
- Review logs. Look for unusual multipart/form-data requests, memory-limit errors, repeated HTTP 500 responses, oversized PHPSESSID cookies and unexplained PHP worker restarts. Record the date and result of the review.
- Assess the breach. If there are signs of leakage, the controller has now "learned" of the breach and the 72 hours to notify the Board have started. If not, record that conclusion and its basis.
- Notify in parallel. Data Protection Board (breach notification form, in Turkish), Cybersecurity Presidency/USOM (Law No. 7545, Art. 7/1-b), sector regulator where applicable (BRSA, CMB, ICTA, Central Bank), insurer, and home authorities (GDPR, NIS2). Inform affected individuals as soon as they are identified.
- Preserve evidence. Image before you rebuild; then file the criminal complaint.
- Report to the board. Minute the decisions of the Turkish entity's board or management, not only the group's.
- Rotate secrets. Because memory may have been read, change administrator passwords, API keys, database credentials and, where warranted, TLS certificates after updating.
- Fix the paperwork. Add patch-window and incident-notice clauses to vendor contracts; check VERBİS registration and the Turkish representative appointment; review the cyber policy's patching condition.
How LimanLegal can help
LimanLegal Law Firm, based in Kartal, Istanbul, advises Turkish and foreign companies on cyber incidents, personal data protection and cybercrime. In a PHP2Shell matter we typically handle the 72-hour plan, the Turkish-language breach notification to the Data Protection Board and the texts sent to affected individuals, reports to the Cybersecurity Presidency and sector regulators, formal notices and damages claims against agencies and hosting providers, challenges to Board fines before the administrative courts, criminal complaints and the follow-up of the investigation, and the defence of compensation claims by customers. We work in English and Turkish and can act for foreign companies under a power of attorney without the client travelling to Turkey. A Turkish-language version of this guide, with additional detail on public institutions, is available here. Contact us through our contact page, by e-mail at [email protected] or by phone at +90 540 097 1035.
Frequently asked questions
Does PHP2Shell affect us if our Turkish website is a simple WordPress brochure site?
Yes, if the server runs a PHP version older than 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35. The vulnerability is in PHP itself, not in WordPress or its plugins, and the researchers showed that even a trivial application can be exploited. A contact form, newsletter sign-up or cookies already mean you process personal data under KVKK.
We found no sign of an attack. Do we still have to notify the Turkish Data Protection Board?
The notification duty under KVKK Article 12/5 arises when personal data have actually been obtained unlawfully; the existence of a vulnerability alone does not trigger it. But because the first flaw allows memory to be read without leaving the usual traces, you should review web-server and PHP logs before concluding that nothing happened, and keep a dated record of that review. If traces are found, the 72 hours run from that finding.
When does the 72-hour period start under KVKK?
From the moment the data controller learns of the breach, not from the moment the breach occurred (Board decision 2019/10). If notification within 72 hours is not possible for justified reasons, the reasons must be stated in the notification, and missing information may be supplied in stages.
Our company is established in the EU and has no Turkish entity. Does KVKK apply?
If you process personal data of people in Turkey, you are a data controller under KVKK regardless of where you are established. Foreign controllers must appoint a representative in Turkey, register with VERBİS and notify breaches to the Board within 72 hours, in addition to their GDPR Article 33 notification.
Do we have to report to the Cybersecurity Presidency as well?
Article 7/1-b of Law No. 7545 requires all entities within scope to report detected vulnerabilities and cyber incidents to the Presidency without delay. The secondary legislation defining the form and thresholds has not yet been published. If you have found an actual compromise or leak, we recommend reporting through the Presidency's reporting channel or your sectoral SOME; the fine for breaching the duty is TRY 1 million to TRY 10 million.
Our Turkish agency manages the site and a Turkish host runs the server. Who gets fined?
Under KVKK you are the data controller; the agency and host are processors, jointly responsible for security under Article 12/2. The Board addresses fines to the controller, which can then seek recourse from the vendor under the contract. Evidence that you instructed and supervised the vendor is decisive.
Can the directors of our Turkish subsidiary be held personally liable?
Under Articles 369 and 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code, board members who failed to establish an adequate security organisation, to supervise the people they delegated to, or to take any decision in the face of a nationally publicised vulnerability may be liable to the company and its shareholders. Minuting the decisions taken this week substantially reduces that risk.
Can we send the server logs to our group forensic team abroad?
Only with a lawful transfer mechanism under KVKK Article 9, such as standard contractual clauses notified to the Board within five business days of signature, binding corporate rules or an adequacy decision, because logs usually contain personal data (IP addresses, user identifiers). Put the mechanism in place before the files leave Turkey, or run the first analysis locally.
Important: This article reflects the law and the public security advisories as of 21 October 2026. The situation is developing: further alerts by the Turkish Cybersecurity Presidency, the Data Protection Authority and sector regulators, and the secondary legislation under Law No. 7545, may change the picture. Check the latest official statements before taking decisions, and obtain advice on your specific facts.
Sources / legal basis
— PHP security release and fixed versions (21 October 2026)
— Wiz Research — PHP2Shell technical analysis and timeline
— The Hacker News — emergency patches and exploitation status
— Sansec — affected platforms and temporary measures
— Turkish Cybersecurity Presidency nationwide alert (NTV, 21 October 2026)
— Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698, Articles 9, 11, 12, 18; Data Protection Board decisions 2019/10 (24 January 2019) and 2019/271 (18 September 2019); Personal Data Security Guide
— Cybersecurity Law No. 7545 (Official Gazette 19 March 2025, No. 32846), Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 16, 17; Cybersecurity Council decision of 5 May 2026 on critical infrastructure sectors
— Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102, Articles 5/A, 369, 375, 378, 553, 626; Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, Articles 49, 58, 112, 115, 116; Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237, Articles 136, 243, 244; Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, Article 134; Law No. 5651, Article 5; Law No. 6563, Article 10
— BRSA Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services (Official Gazette 15 March 2020), Articles 18 and 28; CMB Communiqué VII-128.9; ICTA Regulation on Network and Information Security
— 2026 KVKK fine amounts revalued at 25.49% (Tax Procedure Law, repeated Article 298; Official Gazette 27 November 2025, No. 33090)
— Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 33; Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 23
This article is general information about Turkish law and is not legal advice for any specific case.







